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Excessive Public Defense Workloads:




There is undeniable evidence that throughout much of the
country defense lawyers who furnish legal representation in criminal
and juvenile cases for the indigent have excessive workloads. This
undermines the quality of the representation lawyers provide, often
severely eroding the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel and
impairing their ability to deliver competent and diligent services as
required by rules of professional conduct. The problem, moreover,
has existed for many years, probably in most jurisdictions since efforts
were first made by states and counties to implement the Supreme
Court's right to counsel decisions.
* Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Indiana University School of Law,
Indianapolis. LL.B. 1961, University of Illinois; LL.M., 1964, Georgetown University Law
Center. Professor Lefstein served as co-reporter for the National Right to Counsel
Committee's report on indigent defense cited in this paper and also as reporter for the
second edition of ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, PROVIDING DEFENSE
SERVICES and the DEFENSE FUNCTION. This paper contains content from the author's
book, Securing Reasonable Caseloads: Ethics and Law in Public Defense, to be published
by the American Bar Association in 2011.
1. See, e.g., NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 50-64 (The
Constitution Project 2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED], available at
http://2009transition.org/justicedenied/. This citation is to a section in Chapter 2 of
JUSTICE DENIED titled, "The Need for Reform Is Decades Old." While this paper was
being drafted, the New York Times carried a front page article dealing with problems in
indigent defense. See Monica Davey, Budget Woes Hit Defense Lawyers for the Indigent,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at Al ("Concerns about a deteriorating, overwhelmed public
defender system in this country have been around for decades, but they have ballooned
recently as state budgets shrink and more defendants qualify for free legal counsel."),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/us/10defenders.html. The words
"workload" and "caseloads" are used throughout this paper; for the distinction between
the two, see infra note 13.
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In 2009, two national reports were released dealing with indigent
defense in the United States. The first of these-Justice Denied:
America's Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to
Counsel-was from the National Right to Counsel Committee and
published by the Constitution Project.2 The second report, Minor
Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America's Broken
Misdemeanor Courts, was published by the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers and focused on representation in
misdemeanor cases and other lesser offenses.' Both reports devoted
considerable attention to the issue of excessive caseloads.
This is how Justice Denied summed up the problem:
Frequently, public defenders are asked to represent far too
many clients. Sometimes the defenders have well over 100
clients at a time, with many clients charged with serious
offenses, and their cases moving quickly through the court
system. As a consequence, defense lawyers are constantly
forced to violate their oaths as attorneys because their
caseloads make it impossible for them to practice law as they
are required to do according to the profession's rules. They
cannot interview their clients properly, effectively seek their
pretrial release, file appropriate motions, conduct necessary fact
investigations, negotiate responsibly with the prosecutor,
adequately prepare for hearings, and perform countless other
tasks that normally would be undertaken by a lawyer with
sufficient time and resources. Yes, the clients have lawyers, but
lawyers with crushing caseloads who, through no fault of their
own, provide second-rate legal services, simply because it is not
humanly possible for them to do otherwise.4
The report of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers explained the caseload problem in lower courts this way:
Almost 40 years later, the misdemeanor criminal justice system
is rife with the same problems that existed prior to the
Argersinger decision. Legal representation for indigent
defendants is absent in many cases. Even when an attorney is
2. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1. The National Legal Aid & Defender Association
also served as a sponsor of the National Right to Counsel Committee and its report.
3. ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DOMINO, NAT'L
ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009) [hereinafter
MINOR CRIMES], available at www.nacdl.org/misdemeanor.
4. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 7.
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provided to defend a misdemeanor case, crushing workloads
make it impossible for many defenders to effectively represent
clients. Too often, counsel is unable to spend sufficient time on
each of their cases. This forces even the most competent and
dedicated attorneys to run afoul of their professional duties.
Frequently, judges and prosecutors are complicit in these
breaches, pushing defenders to take action with inadequate
time, despite knowing that the defense attorney lacks
appropriate information about the case and the client.
These two reports are part of a long line of national, state, and
local studies, as well as other publications, that have complained
about the enormous caseloads of those who furnish defense services
and the adverse impact of such caseloads on the quality of the
representation provided.' The reports quoted above imply that
excessive caseloads are confined to public defender programs. While
the most frequent and worst examples of out-of-control caseloads are
among public defenders, private attorneys who provide indigent
defense services sometimes take on way too much work as well.'
They do so in an effort to maximize their incomes because they are
poorly compensated on a per case basis for their services.' Similarly,
those responsible for funding indigent defense sometimes award
5. MINOR CRIMES, supra note 3, at 14.
6. The second of the two reports contained extremely troublesome data respecting
the caseloads of defenders handling misdemeanor cases. For example, in three major
cities- Atlanta, Chicago, and Miami-the defenders were described as handling more
than 2,000 cases per year, and in a number of other jurisdictions the caseloads per year
were exceedingly high. See id. at 21. These caseloads were contrasted with the
recommendation of an earlier federal commission report that recommended that
misdemeanor caseloads not exceed more than 400 cases per year. See NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS: COURTS
(1973) [hereinafter NAC STANDARDS].
7. The total number of lawyers engaged in indigent defense representation
nationwide has not been reliably estimated. However, a recent report suggests that there
are more than 17,000 public defenders in the U.S. See Lynn Langston & Donald J. Farole,
Jr., Public Defender Offices, 2007 - Statistical Tables, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Dep't of Justice at 1 (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdflpdo07st.pdf (last
visited on March 17, 2010).
8. The ABA has recommended that "[a]ssigned counsel should receive prompt
compensation at a reasonable hourly rate and should be reimbursed for their reasonable
out-of-pocket expenses. Assigned counsel should be compensated for all hours necessary
to provide quality legal representation. Compensation for assigned counsel should be
approved by administrators of assigned-counsel programs." ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, Standard 5-2.4 (1992) [hereinafter ABA
PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES]. The reality, however, is that "compensation of
assigned counsel is often far from adequate." JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 64.
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contracts to lawyers who have furnished the lowest bid due to their
willingness to accept an excessive number of cases.9 A government
commissioned report summed up the difficulty of caseloads among
private defense lawyers: "[t]he problem is not limited to public
defenders. Individual attorneys who contract to accept an unlimited
number of cases in a given period often become overwhelmed as well.
Excessive workloads even affect court-appointed attorneys."'o
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice related to the Defense
Function and Providing Defense Services address the problem of
excessive workloads. Similar language appears in the ABA Ten
Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System. Additionally, in
2009, the ABA House of Delegates adopted Eight Guidelines of
Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads, which are much
more detailed than the workload provisions contained in either the
ABA Ten Principles or ABA Criminal Justice Standards. The
ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct also have a number of
provisions related to defense lawyers who are confronted with
excessive workloads. Finally, in 2006, the ABA Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued an opinion on
excessive workloads in public defense. Although ABA ethics
opinions do not constitute ABA policy, the opinion is highly relevant
to the subject under consideration here.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to review the foregoing
ABA sources related to excessive workloads; and (2) to consider
whether any additional policies related to excessive workloads may
be suitable for inclusion in ABA Criminal Justice Standards related
either to the prosecutorial function or the function of the defense bar.
I. ABA Sources Related to Excessive Workloads
A. ABA Criminal Justice Standards
The current edition of ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
related to the Defense Function contains a single sentence concerning
the duty of counsel pertaining to workload:
9. The ABA has long opposed awarding contracts for indigent defense based
primarily on cost. See ABA PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 8, at Standard 5-
3.1. In addition, the ABA has recommended that contracts for defense services contain
"allowable workloads for individual attorneys, and measures to address excessive
workloads...." Id. at Standard 5-3.3(b)(v).
10. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NO. 4, KEEPING
DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 2 (2001).
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Defense counsel should not carry a workload that, by reason of
its excessive size, interferes with the rendering of quality
representation, endangers the client's interest in the speedy
disposition of charges, or may lead to the breach of professional
obligations. 1
The commentary to the foregoing black-letter provision
elaborates on the meaning of the standard:
Although lawyers, like other people, vary in their capacity for
effective performance, there is a limit to how much work any
one lawyer can perform. . .. [T]he lawyer has a duty to accept
no more employment than can be effectively performed without
unreasonable delay. Moreover, it is improper for defense
counsel to accept so much work that the quality of
representation or counsel's professionalism is in any way
diminished for that reason.12
In addition to advising lawyers not to carry excessive workloads,
a black-letter standard in ABA Providing Defense Services advises
lawyers what to do if faced with too many existing cases:
(a) Neither defender organizations, assigned counsel nor
contractors for services should accept workloads that, by reason
of their excessive size, interfere with the rendering of quality
representation or lead to the breach of professional obligations.
Special consideration should be given to the workload created
by representation in capital cases.
(b) Whenever defender organizations, individual defenders,
assigned counsel or contractors for services determine, in the
exercise of their best professional judgment, that the acceptance
of additional cases or continued representation in previously
accepted cases will lead to the furnishing of representation
lacking in quality or to the breach of professional obligations,
the defender organization, individual defender, assigned
counsel or contractor for services must take such steps as may
be appropriate to reduce their pending or projected caseloads,
including the refusal of further appointments. Courts should not
require individuals or programs to accept caseloads that will
11. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-
1.3(e) (1993) [hereinafter ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS].
12. Id.
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lead to the furnishing of representation lacking in quality or to
the breach of professional obligations."
The above standard uses the word "must" in referring to the
need to "take appropriate action" when a breach of professional
obligations will occur. However, elsewhere in ABA Providing
Defense Services, the word "should" is used in the chapter's 27 other
black-letter standards. "Must" apparently was used because a lawyer
has a mandatory duty to take action if continued representation will
result in the breach of a professional duty.
B. ABA Ten Principles
The policy contained in the foregoing standard is also reflected in
the ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System
approved by the ABA in 2002. The Principles "constitute the
fundamental criteria necessary to design a system that provides
effective, efficient, high quality, ethical, conflict-free legal
representation for criminal defendants who are unable to afford an
attorney." 14 The black-letter of Principle 5 is as follows:
Defense counsel's workload is controlled to permit the
rendering of quality representation.15
The "commentary" to Principle 5 importantly states that
"national caseload standards" should never be exceeded.6  ABA
Providing Defense Services and the ABA Defense Function
Standards, both of which are quoted above, for the basis of Principle
5.
13. ABA PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 8, at Standard 5-5.3 (emphasis
added). The History of Standard section following the black-letter quoted in the text
provides definitions for both "workload" and "caseload." Workload refers to "the sum of
all work assigned to an attorney at a given time, which includes the number of cases to
which the attorney is assigned, but also includes other tasks for which the attorney is
responsible." Id. Caseload refers to "the number of cases assigned to an attorney at a
given time." Id.
14. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, ABA TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, Introduction (2002) [hereinafter
ABA TEN PRINCIPLES].
15. Id. at 1.
16. The reference is to the NAC Standards approved in 1973. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
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C. ABA Eight Guidelines
In August 2009, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a
comprehensive policy dealing with the problem of excessive
workloads, titled "Eight Guidelines of Public Defense Related to
Excessive Workloads."" Each of the Guidelines begins with a black-
letter statement followed by commentary. Both constitute ABA
policy and may be cited as policy of the Association, since the ABA
House of Delegates was asked to approve both the black-letter
Guidelines and the commentary.18
The Guidelines build upon the ABA's policy statements on
public defense workloads, including an ABA ethics opinion on the
subject,19 and suggest necessary steps that public defense programs
should take in order to address excessive workloads. While the
Guidelines are consistent with what the ABA has said in the past-in
a few instances simply reiterating what the ABA has said-they also
contain recommendations not previously approved by the ABA. The
Guidelines are summarized below, focusing primarily on material that
constitutes new ABA policy:
The Guidelines contain terminology not previously used in the
ABA Criminal Justice Standards or in the ABA Ten Principles.
The Guidelines refer to "public defense provider" or
"provider," which includes "public defender agencies and ...
programs that furnish assigned lawyers and contract lawyers."
Furthermore, the Guidelines apply "to members of the bar
employed by a defender agency, and those in private practice
who accept appointments to cases for a fee or provide
representation pursuant to contracts." The obvious goal was to
cover all organizations and persons involved in public defense
representation.
17. I proposed the idea of the "guidelines" to the ABA Standing Committee on Legal
Aid and Indigent Defendants, which served as their primary sponsor in the ABA House of
Delegates. While I served as Reporter for the Guidelines, many persons and
organizations made important contributions to them. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON
LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE
RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS, Acknowledgements (2009) [hereinafter ABA
Eight Guidelines], available at www.indigentdefense.org.
18. The resolution proposed to the ABA when the Guidelines were approved reads
as follows: "Resolved, that the American Bar Association adopts the black letter (and
introduction and commentary) Eight Guidelines of Public Defense Related to Excessive
Workloads, dated August 2009." The commentary that accompanies ABA Criminal
Justice Standards is not policy of the Association since not approved by the House of
Delegates, although this distinction is rarely noted when commentary is cited.
19. See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
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In addition to declaring that public defense providers should
avoid excessive workloads, Guideline 1 challenges providers to
consider the wide range of their performance obligations in
representing clients (e.g., "whether sufficient time is devoted to
interviewing and counseling clients"), as a means of
determining whether their caseloads are excessive. This
Guideline derives from concern that too often public defense
providers and the lawyers who furnish representation accept as
normal exceedingly high caseloads, perhaps because that is all
that they have ever known.
Similar to Guideline 1, Guidelines 2, 3, and 4 contain
recommendations that are not in either the ABA Criminal
Justice Standards or the ABA's Ten Principles. Guideline 2
states that public defense providers should have "a supervision
program that continuously monitors workloads of its lawyers;"
Guideline 3 states that lawyers providing representation should
be trained respecting their "professional and ethical ...
responsibilities. . . to inform appropriate persons within the
Public Defense Provider program when they believe their
workload is unreasonable;" and Guideline 4 reminds programs
that furnish public defense that they need to make conscious
decisions about whether or not "excessive lawyer workloads are
present."
Guideline 5 lists a range of non-litigation options for dealing
with excessive workloads, while acknowledging in the
''comment" to the Guideline that the alternatives listed are
"appropriate to pursue only in advance of the time that
workloads actually have become excessive."
The options in Guideline 5 include, inter alia, reassigning cases
to different lawyers (whether public defenders or private
lawyers), arranging for appointments to private lawyers in
return for reasonable compensation, seeking emergency
resources, negotiating informal arrangements with those
making appointments, and "urging prosecutors not to initiate
criminal prosecutions when civil remedies are adequate ....
When no other viable options are available and excessive
caseloads exist, Guideline 6 makes clear that the public defense
20. For citations related to reclassifying some petty misdemeanors as infractions or
violations, thereby avoiding the need to appoint defense counsel, see ABA EIGHT
GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 11 n.39.
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provider or individual lawyer should make a motion in "court to
stop the assignment of new cases and to withdraw from current
cases, as may be appropriate... ." However, a comment to
Guideline 5 suggests that a "separate civil action" may be an
appropriate way to proceed, presumably when the lawyers
believe that motions to withdraw from representation and to
stop appointments are not likely to succeed.
Guideline 7 is new and deals with the concern of many public
defenders that motions to stop assignments and to withdraw
from cases will lead, inevitably, to judges delving into the
internal operations of public defense provider programs,
thereby interfering with "professional and ethical duties [of
lawyers] in representing their clients." To confront this
potential problem, the Guideline urges "Public Defense
Providers and lawyers [to] resist judicial directions regarding
the management of Public Defense Programs
Finally, Guideline 8, consistent with the ABA's ethics opinion,
states that lawyers, as well as public defense providers, should
appeal decisions of courts that reject motions to withdraw or to
halt the assignment new cases. However, the second sentence
of the comment to this Guideline adds something new to the
ABA's policy in this area, because it states that "a writ of
mandamus or prohibition should properly be regarded as a
requirement of 'diligence' under professional conduct rules."
This language was included because the denial of a motion to
withdraw or to stop new assignments is normally not a final
order subject to appeal as a matter of right.22
Finally, there is an additional black-letter non litigation option
listed in Guideline 5 for avoiding excessive caseloads, namely,
"[n]otifying the courts or other appointing authorities that the
Provider [of defense services] is unavailable to accept additional
appointments." The commentary to Guideline 5 explains: "[a]
declaration of 'unavailability' has sometimes been used successfully,
such as in some counties in California. This approach is seemingly
based on the implicit premise that governments, which establish and
fund providers of public defense, never intended that the lawyers who
furnish the representation would be asked to do so if it meant
21. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
22. See Norman Lefstein & Georgia Vagenas, Restraining Excessive Defender
Caseloads: The ABA Ethics Committee Requires Action, 30 CHAMPION 10, 12 (2006)
[hereinafter Lefstein and Vagenas, Restraining Excessive Defender Caseloads], available at
www.indigentdefense.org.
Summer 20111 957
violating their ethical duties pursuant to professional conduct rules."
Declaring "unavailability" is undoubtedly the most simple and
straightforward way of dealing with the excessive caseload problem,
assuming the court accepts the defense claim.
D. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The report of the National Right to Counsel Committee
summarized the adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct among the states and the consequences of violating
provisions of the rules:
[E]very attorney who practices law in the United States,
including all who represent indigent clients, are subject to their
respective states' rules of professional conduct. In each state,
these rules were approved by the state's highest court and,
virtually everywhere, the states' rules are substantially similar in
both form and substance to the ABA Model Rules.... In all
states, moreover, failure to comply with the state's rules of
professional conduct can lead to disciplinary sanctions, such as
reprimand, suspension, or even disbarment.
Excessive caseloads among lawyers representing indigent
criminal and juvenile clients implicate a number of state rules of
professional conduct. The most important of these are the
requirements to be "competent" pursuant to Rule 1.1 ("provide ...
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation")24 and to be "diligent" pursuant to
Rule 1.3 ("act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client").25 The comment to Rule 1.3 contains an
explicit admonition: "[a] lawyer's work load must be controlled so
that each matter can be handled competently."2 6 Also, when a lawyer
23. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 35.
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1.
25. Id. at R. 1.3.
26. Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 2. Comment 1 to Rule 1.3 states that "[a] lawyer must . . . act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client's behalf." This is similar to the ABA's former ethics code: "A lawyer
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). Not all state rules of professional conduct have
adopted the comments recommended by the ABA Model Rules. As of June 2009, the
following ten states had not adopted any comments to their states' rules of professional
conduct: California, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, and South Dakota.
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has too many clients to represent simultaneously, a "concurrent
conflict of interest exists" because "there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client. .. ." According to Rule
1.16 (a)(1), if a lawyer's acceptance of a client's representation, or
continued representation of a client, will lead to a violation of the
rules of professional conduct, the lawyer shall either decline the
representation or seek to withdraw.8 However, a comment to Rule
1.16 acknowledges, that when "a lawyer has been appointed to
represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the
appointing authority."29  Moreover, Rule 1.16 (c) recognizes an
exception to 1.16 (a): "[w]hen ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer
shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for
terminating the representation."
If the defense lawyer believes the court has erred and should
have permitted withdrawal, the lawyer's first option is to seek a stay
and try to appeal the court's ruling." Refusal to represent the client,
even if the defense lawyer believes competent representation is
impossible, risks a contempt finding.32 As the Supreme Court noted
some years ago, "all orders and judgments of courts must be complied
with promptly. If a person to whom a court directs an order believes
that order is incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but, absent a stay, he
must comply promptly with the order pending appeal. Persons who
make private determinations of the law and refuse to obey an order
generally risk criminal contempt even if the order is ultimately ruled
incorrect.""
A corollary to Rule 1.16 is Rule 6.2, which provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2).
28. Id. at R. 1.16(a)(1).
29. Id. at R. 1.16 cmt. 3.
30. Id. at R. 1.16(c).
31. However, the court's decision will not likely be subject to appeal as a matter of
right. See Lefstein and Vagenas, Restraining Excessive Defender Caseloads, supra note 22,
at 12.
32. See, e.g., People v. McKenzie, 668 P.2d 769,776 (Cal. 1983) (court may hold public
defender in contempt when defender refuses to proceed due to belief that trial court's
rulings rendered effective representation impossible); In re Galloway, 389 A.2d 55, 55-57
(Pa.1978) (finding of contempt proper when defense lawyer's request to withdraw was
denied and defense lawyer refused to proceed).
33. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975). But see discussion at infra notes 67-
96 and accompanying text.
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a person except for good cause, such as: (a) representing the client is
likely to result in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct... ."" A comment to this rule refers the reader back to the
duty to deliver "competent" representation: "Good cause exists if the
lawyer could not handle the matter competently, see Rule 1.1 ....
The ABA Model Rules also has provisions governing the
relationship between subordinate and supervisory lawyers, and these
have a bearing on the responsibilities of each when there is an issue
respecting excessive caseloads. As for the subordinate lawyer, Rule
5.2 states that the "lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional
Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of
another person. ,36 This is a bedrock principle of the legal profession,
the importance of which is not always well understood and repeatedly
overlooked in the area of public defense. What it means is that,
except in the situation discussed below, every lawyer is responsible
individually for providing competent and diligent legal representation.
Here is how one writer has explained the duty of each member of the
legal profession:
All attorneys, including subordinate attorneys, are responsible
for their own misconduct even if it occurred at the direction of a
supervisor, and even if the attorney acquiesced from a fear of
loss of employment. This rule unequivocally disposes of any
"Nuremburg" defense in which a subordinate attempts to deny
responsibility because he or she was merely acting in
accordance with the orders of a superior. In a larger sense,
however, this rule of independent responsibility simply states an
obvious and paramount duty of professional conduct: each
lawyer is ultimately responsible for his or her own actions. 37
But Rule 5.2 also contains an exception: "[a] subordinate lawyer
does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts
in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an
arguable question of professional duty."" Thus, if there is "an
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 6.2(a).
35. Id. at R. 6.2 cmt. 2.
36. Id. at R. 5.2(a).
37. Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys'
Supervisory Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 259, 295-97 (1994). See also Douglas R.
Richmond, Subordinate Lawyers and Insubordinate Duties, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 449, 463
(2003). See generally Robert F. Keatinge, The Floggings Will Continue Until Morale
Improves: The Supervising Attorney and His or Her Firm, 39 SO. TEx. L. REV. 279 (1998).
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 5.2(b).
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arguable question" whether the subordinate lawyer has an excessive
caseload, and the subordinate lawyer continues to provide
representation at the direction of the supervisor notwithstanding
concerns whether "competent" and "diligent" representation can be
provided, no violation of professional conduct rules has occurred.
Conversely, if the situation is not arguable because, for example, the
size of the caseload clearly interferes with providing competent and
diligent representation, the subordinate lawyer is guilty of
professional misconduct unless a good faith effort is made to avoid
additional assignments and the lawyer seeks to withdraw from one or
more existing cases.3 9 What the rules do not-and cannot decide-is
when a matter of disagreement about caseload is "an arguable
question." This is a matter of judgment among professionals and, at
least theoretically, there could be a reasonable disagreement on the
subject between the supervisor and subordinate lawyer.'
What about the applicability of professional conduct rules to
the heads of public defense programs and to supervisors when
subordinate lawyers with excessive caseloads are permitted to
represent clients? The answer is contained in Rule 5.1, which spells
out the duties of those with "managerial" and "supervisory
authority."41 Although the rule uses the term "law firm," the
terminology section of the Model Rules makes clear that the term is
intended to include public defense programs.42 According to Rule 5.1,
persons with "managerial authority" are required "to ensure that the
firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all
lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct."4
And those with "direct supervisory authority over another lawyer"
have a duty to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other
lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.""
39. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
40. "If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both
lawyers is clear and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question
is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority
ordinarily reposes in the supervisor, and a subordinate may be guided accordingly."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 5.2(b) cmt. 2.
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 5.1(a)-(b) (2007).
42. "'Firm' or 'law firm' denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership,
professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice
law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a
corporation or other organization." Id. at R. 1.0(e).
43. Id. at R. 5.1(a).
44. Id. at R. 5.1(b).
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Rule 5.1 spells out several situations in which one lawyer "shall
be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct." 45 The first is where a lawyer "orders or, with
knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved." 46
The second is where a lawyer with "managerial authority" or "direct
supervisory authority ... knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable
remedial action." 47 These rules are not especially difficult to apply to
situations where lawyers furnishing public defense services have
excessive caseloads. In all likelihood, there are many such programs
throughout the country where managers and supervisors are subject
to charges of professional misconduct because they are well aware of
the excessive caseloads of their lawyers and fail to take appropriate
actions to prevent them.
E. ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 06-441
In 2006, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility ("ABA Ethics Committee") issued
Formal Opinion 06-441 dealing with excessive caseloads and public
defense representation.' The effort to persuade the ABA's Ethics
Committee to issue an opinion on the subject of caseloads was a joint
undertaking of the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and
Indigent Defendants ("SCLAID") and the National Legal Aid &
Defender Association ("NLADA"). 49 Because ABA ethics opinions
must be based on ABA Model Rules, there was never any real doubt
about what the opinion would say concerning excessive public
defense caseloads. As discussed in the preceding section, when
caseloads are excessive, the rules of professional conduct are clear
respecting the duties of those with managerial and supervisory
authority, as well as the duty of lawyers providing direct client
services.
45. Id. at R. 5.1(c).
46. Id. at R. 5.1(c)(1).
47. Id. at R. 5.1(c)(2).
48. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006)
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 06-441].
49. See Lefstein & Vagenas, Restraining Excessive Defender Caseloads, supra note
22, at 11.
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The most important points in the opinion can be summarized as
follows:o
The opinion applies not only to public defenders, but to all
lawyers who represent indigents in criminal cases pursuant
either to court appointments or to government contracts."
"The Rules [of Professional Conduct] provide no exception for
lawyers who represent indigent persons charged with crimes."S
All lawyers who furnish defense representation on behalf of the
indigent must provide services that are competent and diligent.
"A lawyer's primary ethical duty is owed to existing clients."53
If competent and diligent representation is not possible due to
an excessive workload, or if a workload soon will become
excessive, a lawyer cannot accept new clients.54
If cases are assigned by courts or through some other form of
appointment system, the lawyer should request a stop to new
appointments.
If a lawyer represents a client and cannot provide competent
and diligent representation and the problem cannot be resolved
through a request to the court, the lawyer must move to
withdraw from a sufficient number of cases in order that
representation can be furnished in compliance with the Rules of
Professional Conduct."
50. The ethics opinion as applied to the private practice of law is discussed in Arthur
J. Lachman, What You Should Know Can Hurt You: Management and Supervisory
Responsibilities for the Misconduct of Others Under Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3, 18 PROF.
LAW. 1 (2007).
51. ABA Formal Op. 06-441, n.2. The rationale of the opinion applies regardless of
the manner in which lawyers become involved in representing indigent defendants.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Among options listed are the following: "requesting that the court refrain from
assigning the lawyer any new cases until such time as the lawyer's existing caseload has
been reduced to a level that she is able to accept new cases and provide competent legal
representation." Id. Thus, before filing a motion in court, the ethics opinion recognizes
that a lawyer's initial approach to the problem should be by making a "request" to the
court. The opinion does not address the way this should be communicated, i.e., whether
via email, letter, informal personal conversation, etcetera.
56. Id.
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If a lawyer's motion to withdraw is rejected by a court, the
lawyer should appeal, if possible; but if an appeal is either
unavailable or unsuccessful," the lawyer must continue with the
representation and make the best of the situation, "while taking
whatever steps are feasible to ensure that she will be able to
competently and diligently represent the defendant.",8
Heads of defender programs, lawyer supervisors, and others
"with intermediate managerial responsibility, over the
professional work of a firm or public sector legal agency or
department shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
other lawyers in the agenc' or department conform to the Rules
of Professional Conduct."
Lawyer supervisors must monitor the workloads of subordinate
lawyers to ensure that they do not prevent the delivery of
competent and diligent services.
Lawyers may consider standards respecting caseload limits in
deciding whether the workload of a lawyer is excessive, but
standards cannot be the "sole factor;"61 whether a workload is
excessive "depends not only on the number of cases, but also on
such factors as case complexity, the availability of support
services, the lawyer's experience and ability, and the lawyer's
nonrepresentational responsibilities."62
When a lawyer receives cases as a member of a public
defender's staff or law firm, and supervisors are aware that the
lawyer's workload is excessive, the supervisor has a duty to take
remedial action, such as transferring non-representational
duties to others, not assigning new cases to the lawyer, and
possibly transferring cases to others within the public defender's
office or law firm.63
57. "If the court denies the lawyer's motion to withdraw, and any available means of
appealing such ruling is unsuccessful, the lawyer must continue with the representation . . .
Id. at 1.
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 5.
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If supervisors "know" of a lawyer's excessive caseload and do
not take "reasonable remedial action," supervisors are
themselves responsible for the lawyer's violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.64
If a lawyer and supervisor disagree about whether workload is
preventing the lawyer from providing competent and diligent
services, the lawyer may rely on the decision of the supervisor if
it constitutes a "reasonable resolution of an arguable question
of professional duty." 5
If the lawyer deems the resolution of the supervisor to be
unreasonable, the lawyer must continue up the chain of
command, which may lead to taking the matter to the head of
the defender program and even to the program's governing
board, if there is one.6
H. Should There Be Additional Commentary or Black-Letter
Criminal Justice Standards Related to Excessive Indigent
Defense Workloads?
The question whether ABA Criminal Justice Standards
pertaining to excessive workloads in indigent defense should contain
additional commentary or black-letter rules may seem surprising
since the ABA has dealt with the subject so extensively. Not only are
excessive workloads addressed in two Criminal Justice Standards (i.e.,
the Defense Function and Providing Defense Services), but there are
various provisions of the ABA Model Rules that apply to the subject.
Also, there is an ABA ethics opinion that explains how the Model
Rules pertain to excessive workloads, and there are Eight Guidelines
and commentary that deal at length with the subject. In fact, there
are few subjects about which the ABA has had more to say.
Nevertheless, I believe there may still be two issues related to
excessive public defense workloads deserving of additional attention
in ABA Criminal Justice Standards, one to be dealt with in
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id. at 6.
66. Id. The requirement that a lawyer take his or her complaint to the program's
governing board if the lawyer concludes that the supervisor and head of the agency have
reached an "unreasonable" decision about whether the lawyer's workload is excessive is
based upon MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (b)-(c) (2007). See Lefstein &
Vagenas, Restraining Excessive Defender Caseloads, supra note 22, at 13-14.
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commentary and the other in a black-letter standard and
accompanying commentary.
A. Refusing to Provide Representation in New Cases
Should a defense lawyer or defense program consider refusing to
represent clients when convinced that it cannot provide competent
and diligent legal services consistent with their duties under
professional conduct rules? Assume that the defense is being
appointed by the trial court, which is what typically occurs, and the
defense explains to the court, either orally or in an informal written
communication (e.g., an email, memorandum or letter), that
additional appointments cannot be accepted due to excessive
workload. Thus, the defense declares that it is "unavailable" for
additional court appointments, providing such information about the
situation as deemed appropriate, and making clear that it will not
provide representation in new cases. This course would be in lieu of
filing a formal written motion with the court asking that new case
assignments be stopped. For reasons explained below, I believe it
may be appropriate for this issue to be discussed in commentary to
any revised Criminal Justice Standard dealing with excessive
workloads.
1. ABA Authority Related to Refusing Court Appointments
As noted earlier, in explaining the meaning of ABA Model Rule
6.2, comment 2 states that "[flor good cause a lawyer may seek to
decline to represent a person who cannot afford to retain counsel....
Good cause exists if the lawyer could not handle the matter
competently, see Rule 1.1."67 The rule is silent about whether the
defense should file a motion asking that new court appointments be
stopped. Arguably, Rule 6.2 is satisfied if a defense lawyer or defense
program informs the court either orally or in a written
communication, other than a formal written motion, that additional
cases cannot be accepted due to an inability to provide competent
and diligent legal services for additional clients.
Of the two ABA Criminal Justice Standards that deal with
excessive workloads, ABA Providing Defense Services discusses the
subject in much more detail than the ABA Defense Function. Also,
as noted previously, the relevant standard informs lawyers and their
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 6.2 cmt (2007). See also supra notes 34-
35 and accompanying text.
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defense programs that they "must take such steps as may be
appropriate to reduce their pending or projected caseloads, including
the refusal of further appointments."" But neither in the black-letter
standard nor in the accompanying commentary is any mention made
of filing a written motion asking that the trial court not appoint the
defense lawyer or defense program to additional cases. Instead, the
commentary states only that "[in the case of a defender program with
excessive workload, additional cases must be refused and, if
necessary, pending cases transferred to assigned counsel."6
Filing a motion with the court is mentioned in the 2006 ABA
ethics opinion on excessive workloads, but only in connection with
withdrawal from representation, not in relation to stopping the
assignment of new cases. Thus, the ethics opinion states that if a
lawyer is receiving appointments directly from the court and the
lawyer's "workload will become, or already is, excessive,,70
appropriate action may include "requesting that the court refrain
from assigning the lawyer any new cases."71  While this request
presumably could be in the form of a motion, the ethics opinion,
consistent with Model Rule 6.2, does not mention filing a formal
written motion with the court seeking to avoid new appointments.
The one ABA source that mentions filing motions to stop new
assignments is the Eight Guidelines. The black letter of Guideline 5
suggests that public defense providers take "prompt actions"7 when
workloads are or are about to become excessive, including
"[n]otifying courts or other appointing authorities that the Provider is
unavailable to accept additional appointments."7  However, the
commentary to Guideline 5 suggests that "[w]hen a Provider cannot
reduce excessive lawyer workloads, a motion filed with the court,
aimed at stopping case assignments and/or permitting lawyers to
withdraw from cases (see Guideline 6 infra), or conceivably the filing
of a separate civil action, will be necessary." 74 Moreover, Guideline 6,
unlike ABA Model Rule 6.2, ABA Providing Defense Services, and
the ABA's ethics opinion is explicit about the possibility of filing
"motions asking a court to stop the assignment of new cases and to
68. PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 8, at 5-5.3(b).
69. Id. at 74.
70. ABA Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 48, at 5.
71. Id.
72. ABA EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 9.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 11.
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withdraw from new cases, as may be appropriate."7 In addition, the
commentary to Guideline 6 contains information about how to
litigate such motions, suggesting that the indigent defense provider
"may deem it advisable to present statistical data, anecdotal
information, as well as other kinds of evidence."76  The Eight
Guidelines, however, do not preclude the other possible option, i.e.,
refusing to represent clients if the court rejects the defense
announcement that it is "unavailable" to accept additional clients.
2. Difference Between Filing a Motion and Declaring "Unavailable"
Why does it matter whether a defense lawyer or defense program
files a formal written motion asking that additional cases not be
assigned to the defense versus notifying a court of its "unavailability"
to accept new appointments? If a motion is filed, the defense is the
moving party in a formal court proceeding and thus responsible for
establishing that it cannot provide competent and diligent
representation to new clients due to its workload. And, as noted
previously, if the trial court rejects the defense motion, the judge's
decision is usually not a final, appealable order as a matter of right, so
that the defense may be unable to avoid accepting the new court
appointments. But even if the trial court grants the defense motion,
the court's order will likely be stayed and the defense ordered to
continue to provide representation on behalf of new clients despite its
conclusion that competent and diligent representation is impossible.
Currently, for example, there is a case on appeal in Florida in which
the public defender in Dade County filed motions to stop the
assignment of new cases to its felony lawyers. After a two-day
hearing before a trial court judge, the public defender's motion was
substantially granted, but the trial court's order was stayed and the
matter appealed by the State of Florida. Meanwhile, the public
defender's office has had to continue to accept literally thousands of
additional felony cases while litigation has dragged on in the appellate
courts.
75. Id. at 12.
76. Id.
77. See Lefstein & Vagenas, Restraining Excessive Defender Caseloads, supra note
22, at 12 ("However, an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's denial of a defender's
motion for relief based upon an excessive caseload appears not to be available anywhere
as a matter of right. Invariably, when an appellate court hears an appeal in such a case, it
is because the court has decided to do so in the exercise of its discretion.").
78. The Miami Dade County Public Defender has been litigating two "excessive
workload" cases that as of April 2011 are pending before the Florida Supreme Court. In
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On the other hand, suppose the defense does not proceed with a
motion to stop new cases, but instead advises the trial court that it is
"unavailable" to accept new cases and explains its reasons. What
possible outcomes may ensue? One possibility is that the trial court
accepts the defense position and arrangements are made for other
lawyers to be appointed to the excess cases. The other possibility is
that the trial judge becomes angry, objects to the position of the
defense, and orders the defense either to accept the new case
assignments or be held in contempt. 79
How likely is it that the trial court will hold either a defense
lawyer or head of a defense program in contempt for refusing to
provide representation of new clients? A search of appellate
decisions does not reveal exact precedents for defenders or the
leaders of defense programs being held in contempt for refusing to
provide representation in multiple cases due to excessive workloads.'
This is not surprising, as there are relatively few reported decisions in
which either defense lawyers or programs have sought to withdraw
each case, the litigation was begun with motions filed in trial courts, in one case seeking to
have other counsel appointed in new felony cases, and in the other case seeking to be
permitted to withdraw as counsel in certain felony cases. Favorable rulings were obtained
in both cases from trial court judges, in the first case on September 3, 2008, and in the
second case on October 29, 2009. However, in each case the Florida Third District Court
of Appeal stayed the trial court judges' rulings, later reversed the trial court judges'
orders, and thus cases have continued to be assigned to the Miami Dade County Public
Defender just as they were before the litigation was begun. Now, more than two years
after the first case was filed in the trial court, the Florida Supreme Court has decided to
hear the first of the two cases. The extensive pleadings, briefs, and the record in the two
cases is on the website of the Miami Dade County Public Defender. MIAMI-DADE
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Excessive Workload Litigation, http://www.pdmiami.com/Excessive
Workload/Excessive Workload Pleadings.htm (last visited March 1, 2011). I testified as
an expert witness in both of these cases on behalf of the Miami Dade County Public
Defender. In the first of the two cases, my affidavit states that I calculated the average
number of new felony noncapital cases per attorney per annum to be 387, and the average
number of new misdemeanor and criminal traffic cases per attorney per year to be 2,232.
See also infra note 125.
79. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. Even if a motion is filed by the
defense asking that new appointments be halted, the defense could still, at least
theoretically, refuse to proceed with representation in new cases if the motion were
unsuccessful. However, courts in this situation are apt to be especially unsympathetic to a
defense refusal to accept new appointments since, by filing a motion seeking caseload
relief, the defense seemingly implies that it is willing to abide by judicial orders entered in
response to its motion.
80. However, there are cases in which both public defenders and other defense
lawyers have been held in contempt for refusing to proceed in providing defense services
on behalf of a single indigent accused in a criminal case. See J. W. Thomey, Attorney's
Refusal to Accept Appointment to Defend Indigent, or to Proceed in Such Defense, 36
A.L.R.3d 1221 (1971). See also cases cited at supra note 32.
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from cases and/or to stop appointments. In reported cases, when the
defense has complained of excessive workloads and sought to refuse
new appointments, they have filed motions in trial courts seeking
relief."
Surely some judges will empathize when a defense lawyer or
defense program refuses to proceed based upon concerns for their
professional responsibility duties and will be reluctant to hold well-
intentioned defense lawyers in contempt. My one personal
experience with this issue occurred in the 1970s when I was the
director of the Public Defender Service ("PDS") in Washington, D.C.
Private lawyers who had been accepting many of the indigent defense
cases went on "strike" due to their concern that the government's
appropriation for assigned counsel would likely be inadequate to
compensate them when vouchers for their representation were
submitted for reimbursement. Accordingly, the chief judge of the
D.C. Superior Court informed me that PDS lawyers would need to
increase their caseloads substantially in order to handle the cases that
private lawyers were unwilling to accept. When I told the chief judge
that PDS would refuse his request and that holding me in contempt
would not change my mind about the matter, the chief judge backed
down, essentially saying that if the agency would not "assist" the
court with its caseload problem, the court would have to find an
alternative solution.'
81. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 121-26 reviews litigation in which defense
programs have challenged their caseloads based upon professional responsibility rules:
"Now, with increasing frequency, defenders are claiming not only that the constitutional
rights of their clients are jeopardized by excessive caseloads, so, too, are their
responsibilities as members of the legal profession pursuant to rules of professional
conduct, which require that competent and diligent representation be provided. This
relatively new approach has undoubtedly been fueled by the 2006 ethics opinion of the
ABA Standing Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility ..... Id. at
121. The report then discusses four well-publicized cases in which public defender
programs filed motions in trial courts challenging their caseloads, i.e., in Kingman,
Arizona; Knoxville, Tennessee; Miami, Florida (see also supra note 78 and accompanying
text); and New Orleans, Louisiana. In each of these cases, I served as an expert witness on
behalf of the public defender agencies. Except in the Arizona case, either part or all of the
relief sought by the defender programs included a request that the courts stop the
assignment of new cases to which the defense would otherwise be appointed.
82. In cooperation with the court, PDS agreed to recruit and train private members
of the bar from large law firms to accept indigent cases temporarily on an emergency pro
bono basis. In 1983, a similar "strike" of private assigned counsel led the Federal Trade
Commission to claim that the lawyers were engaged in a conspiracy to fix prices and to
conduct a boycott that constituted unfair methods of competition. The case ultimately was
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held in favor of the FTC and against the
lawyers. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
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3. The Case for Declaring "Unavailable" and Refusing to Proceed
There are potential advantages to the defense (and admittedly
some risk) in forcing the court to be the moving party when there is a
dispute about the defense accepting new appointments. Not only
must the court prove that the conduct of the defense is
contemptuous, but if a contempt order is entered against the
defense, it is sure to be a final appealable order for which the defense
can seek a stay pending resolution of the dispute in the appellate
courts. Conversely, if the defense provides representation when
workloads are excessive, clients invariably are harmed in a variety of
ways, such as pretrial release motions not being filed, necessary
investigations not conducted, and guilty pleas entered when they
should not be. If clients are convicted, reversals will be based upon
the standard of Strickland v. Washington,8 which requires that
prejudice be demonstrated." Thus, the harm visited upon clients
83. The exact route pursuant to which a defense lawyer or head of a defense program
might actually be held in contempt is difficult to predict. Here is one possible scenario:
Assume that a court is notified by either a defense lawyer or head of a defense program
that additional appointments cannot be accepted due to excessive workload, but the court
nevertheless enters orders appointing the lawyer or defense program to new cases. Upon
receipt of the order of appointment, assume further that the defense lawyer or head of the
defense agency again informs the court of its "unavailability" to represent clients in the
new cases to which they have been appointed, and therefore the defense does not plan to
enter appearances for the new clients because of its duties under rules of professional
conduct. Now, assume that the court holds the defense lawyer or head of the defender
program in contempt. Whether this would be criminal or civil contempt is unclear,
especially since the same conduct can sometimes be treated as either. Arguably, under the
foregoing scenario, the defense conduct would not qualify as direct contempt, which can
be punished summarily, since it did not occur in the presence of the court. More likely,
the defense conduct would be regarded as "[i]ndirect or constructive contempt beyond the
presence of the court ... ; punishment for such contempt usually requires the observance
of all elements of due process of law. . . . Due process requires that an individual charged
with an indirect contempt be given full and complete notification and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges by asserting a defense or providing an explanation." 17
C.J.S. Contempt § 77 (1999). In contrast to the hypothetical scenario, in State v. Jones, No.
2008-P-0018, 2008 WL 5428009 (Ohio App. 11th Dist. 2008), a public defender was-denied
a continuance and, in the presence of the court, refused to proceed. The defendant was
held in "direct criminal contempt" since the conduct occurred in the court's presence.
However, the appellate court reversed the contempt conviction, as explained in the
discussion of the Jones case that follows in the text of this paper. See infra notes 86-92 and
accompanying text.
84. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
85. As the National Right to Counsel Committee noted in JUSTICE DENIED, supra
note 1, at 40-41: "Since Strickland was decided, commentators have been virtually
unanimous in their criticisms of the opinion. Some have echoed views of Justice Marshall,
whereas others have accused the Supreme Court of being insensitive to the very serious
problem of adequate representation. Most of all, the decision has been criticized due to
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when the defense labors under excessive caseloads is often
irreparable.
State v. Jones," decided in 2008 by an Ohio appellate court,
illustrates why the defense should consider declaring unavailability
instead of acquiescing in the acceptance of new cases when it is
unable to provide representation as required by rules of professional
conduct. An assistant public defender was assigned to represent a
client charged with misdemeanor assault, and the case was set for trial
the following day. However, the public defender did not actually
receive the client's file until the morning of trial, and prior to its
receipt the public defender met with six of his other clients. Then, for
twenty minutes, the public defender had a meeting with the client in
question. When the defender advised the trial judge that his client
wanted a jury trial, the judge informed the defender that the case
would be tried that afternoon. The defender explained that he could
not be ready by the afternoon because he needed to interview
witnesses, but the judge warned the defender that he would be held in
contempt if he refused to proceed, stating that "if a conviction
resulted, the defendant could file an appeal on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel."" Ultimately, when the defender refused to
proceed, he was held in contempt and ordered taken into custody.
Soon afterwards the judge ordered a bond of 10% of $1,000, the
requisite fee on the bond was posted, and the public defender was
released.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the finding of contempt,
concluding that "a continuance was warranted" and that its denial
"was an abuse of discretion."' As the appellate court further
explained:
Under these circumstances, effective assistance and ethical
compliance were impossible as appellant was not permitted
sufficient time to conduct a satisfactory investigation as
required by ... [rules of ethics] and the Sixth Amendment ....
the exceedingly difficult burden of proof placed on defendants in challenging counsel's
representation and because it has led appellate courts to sustain convictions in truly
astonishing situations." As a result of its dismay with the Strickland standard, the
committee called for a new test for ineffective assistance of counsel, which would be
"substantially consistent with the ethical obligation of defense counsel to render
competent and diligent representation." Id. at 212.
86. Jones, 2008 WL 5428009.
87. Id. at *1.
88. Id. at *4.
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It would have been unethical for appellant to proceed with trial
as any attempt at rendering effective assistance would have
been futile. 9
The appellate court also concluded that the trial judge had
"improperly placed an administrative objective of controlling the
court's docket above its supervisory imperative of facilitating
effective, prepared representation of a fair trial."' Further, the court
noted that "[d]irect appeal is not a reliable remedy to fix an obvious
error."1 If the defendant had been convicted, "the presumption of
innocence would have been unfairly replaced by a burden on appeal
to demonstrate a 'reasonable probability' that the result of the
proceeding would have been different if ... [the defense] had been
prepared."'
I appreciate that refusing to proceed with representation due to
excessive defense workloads and thus intentionally risking the
possibility of contempt may seem to some to be irresponsible
behavior in violation of professional conduct rules." In response, I
suggest that the idea is no different in principle from what the public
defender did in the Jones case, except that in Jones the public
defender was seeking to vindicate the rights at trial of a single
defendant, whereas the rights of many more defendants, both during
the pretrial stage and at trial, are at stake when a defense lawyer or
defense program seeks to avoid new appointments due to excessive
workloads. In defending his position, the public defender in Jones
cited to the trial court an earlier Ohio decision in which the facts were
similar. The appellate court in the prior case put the matter
succinctly: "Defense counsel should not be required to violate his
duty to his client [under the Sixth Amendment and ethics rules] as the
price of avoiding punishment for contempt." 94 Yet, that is precisely
what defense programs do when they file motions for judicial relief
that are denied despite truly astonishing caseloads that prevent
89. Id.
90. Id. at *5.
91. Id. at *6.
92. Id.
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c); see also supra notes 30-33
and accompanying text.
94. In re Sherlock, 525 N.E.2d 512 (Ohio App. 2d Dist. 1987) (quoting par. 3 of
Appellate Court's syllabus).
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competent and diligent representation under rules of professional
conduct.
To underscore what sometimes transpires when public defenders
seek caseload relief through motions, consider a 2008 case from
Knoxville, Tennessee. Public Defender Mark Stephens filed a motion
asking five trial court judges to suspend appointments temporarily to
his office in misdemeanor cases. The office operated under a "zone
representation" system in misdemeanor cases in which clients were
not actually assigned to specific lawyers because therewere too many
clients and too few lawyers. The trial court judges granted Stephens
an evidentiary hearing during which he presented substantial
statistical data and numerous witnesses testified, including experts.
After a delay of about eight months, the five judges finally issued a
two and one-half page order denying all relief while completely
ignoring the record developed during the hearing." During the
hearing on his motion in 2008, Mr. Stephens explained the difficulty
his office confronted in providing defense services:
[S]o there's [no time] ... to do any on-scene investigations.
There's [no time] ... to do any contacting of [police]
officers .... There's ... [no] time to interview any witnesses.
You just go into court you fly by the seat of your pants to see
what you can accomplish .... The caseloads that currently exist
in my office, in my view, prohibit my lawyers from fulfilling
their ethical obligations and duties that they owe to their
client .... And, consequently, the constitutional right of the
accused to have a lawyer who is meeting his or her ethical
responsibility to that client is not being fulfilled, and it's
because of caseload, it's not as a result of the commitment or
effort on the part of the lawyers.9
B. Role of the Prosecutor When Defense Seeks Caseload Relief
In the several cases in recent years in which public defender
agencies filed motions seeking relief from excessive caseloads, the
95. In re: Pet. of Knox County Public Defender, General Sessions Court for Knox
County, Tennessee, Misdemeanor Division, Docket No. Not Assigned, February 20,2009.
96. In re: Pet. of Knox Cnty. Pub. Defender, General Sessions Court for Knox
County, Tennessee, Misdemeanor Division, Docket No. Not Assigned, filed March 26,
2008, Transcript of Record, 27-31 (June 10, 2008). For copies of pleadings, petitions and
related documents pertaining to this litigation, see website of the Public Defender for the
Sixth Judicial District, Knoxville, TN, COMMUNITY LAW OFFICE, Caseload Litigation,
http://www.pdknox.org/caseloads (last visited March 1, 2011).
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quality of legal representation furnished by the defenders can only be
described as marginal at best, if not woefully inadequate." In my
judgment, it is simply impossible for an objective observer to regard
the representation provided by the defenders in these cases as
competent and diligent as required by rules of professional
responsibility. The testimony of Mark Stephens, the Public Defender
in Knoxville, quoted immediately above, is typical of what chief
defenders have said about the representation furnished by their
lawyers. Flying by the "seat of your pants," as Stephens characterized
the representation of his lawyers, is the antithesis of "competence,"
which requires ... thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation."98  Yet, in the cases filed by the
public defenders in Miami and Knoxville, the local prosecutor,
attorney general's offices, or both, opposed defense claims about
their caseloads at the trial level and on appeal."
The position typically adopted by prosecutors when public
defenders complain about their caseloads is further illustrated by
what is occurring now in Missouri. For many years, studies have
documented that the Missouri State Public Defender ("MSPD")
program is underfunded and constantly struggling with exceedingly
97. The jurisdictions to which I refer are Kingman, Arizona; Knoxville, Tennessee;
Miami, Florida; and New Orleans, Louisiana. In each of the jurisdictions I was an expert
witness for the defense. See also supra note 81. My characterization of the representation
provided by the lawyers in those jurisdictions is based upon my knowledge of the evidence
presented in those cases. It is not intended as a criticism of the lawyers, because in each of
the jurisdictions the lawyers were burdened with far too many cases and had inadequate
support services.
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007).
99. As noted previously, the pleadings in the Knoxville case are on the website of the
city's Public Defender agency. See supra note 96. In this litigation, the Public Defender
has been opposed by the office of the Tennessee Attorney General, which successfully
intervened on behalf of the Tennessee Administrative Office of Courts ("AOC"), pointing
out that the AOC would be responsible for additional defense service costs if the Public
Defender were successful in reducing his caseload. In Tennessee, all funding of indigent
defense services is provided by the State. In the Miami litigation, the Public defender was
opposed at the trial level by the State's Attorney in Miami and also by the General
Counsel of the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association. On appeal, before a Florida
intermediate appellate court and the Supreme Court of Florida, the state is represented by
the Florida Attorney General's office. All funding of indigent defense is provided by the
State of Florida. Pleadings and other documents related to the Miami litigation is on the
website of the Miami-Dade County Public Defender. MIAMI-DADE PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Excessive Workload Litigation, http://www.pdmiami.com/ExcessiveWorkload/Excessive
WorkloadPleadings.htm (last visited March 1, 2011).
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high caseloads." In December 2009, the Missouri Supreme Court
decided a case in which it acknowledged the overwhelming caseloads
with which the MSPD was dealing and essentially conceded that the
state's assistant public defenders were violating their responsibilities
under rules of ethics.o' Further, the Missouri Supreme Court invited
the agency to declare district state public defender offices
"unavailable" to accept new cases when their caseloads had exceeded
certain maximum numbers for three consecutive months.102
Accordingly, district offices of the MSPD are either beginning to
refuse additional cases or to put courts on notice that they may start
to refuse new cases in the near future."as In response, prosecutors in
Missouri have vigorously complained about the conduct of the
MSPD. In fact, a county prosecutor who serves as President of the
Missouri Prosecuting Attorneys Association labeled the conduct of
the MSPD as "reckless, self interested and irresponsible" and
"attempting to hold the entire criminal justice system hostage.""
100. See, e.g., The Spangenberg Group and The Center for Justice, Law and Society at
George Mason University, Assessment of the Missouri State Public Defender System
(October 2009), http://members.mobar.org/pdfs/public-defender/2009-report.pdf. The
following is a partial summary of the report's conclusion: "For close to a decade, MSPD
has received no substantial increase in its appropriations, despite the fact that year-by-
year, MSPD has submitted budgets demonstrating that it is seriously underfunded and
overloaded with cases. All three branches of government are on notice that Missouri has
been operating a constitutionally inadequate system for some time now. MSPD has gone
to the trial courts, to the courts of appeal, to the legislature, and to the governor. Yet the
situation remains the same. And so each day in Missouri, the State places the lives of poor
citizens into the hands of attorneys who are underpaid, overworked, and badly supervised....
Missouri's public defender system stands at the bottom of its sister states in terms of resources,
and the results are alarming. Missouri's public defender system has reached a point where
what it provides is often nothing more than the illusion of a lawyer." Id. at 66.
101. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 880 (2009) ("The
excessive number of cases to which the public defender's offices currently are being
assigned calls into question whether any public defender fully is meeting his or her ethical
duties of competent and diligent representation in all cases assigned. The cases presented
here to this Court show both the constitutional and ethical dilemmas currently facing the
Office of the State Public Defender and its clients.").
102. Id. at 887.
103. See, e.g., Missouri Public Defender Offices Face Caseload Crunch, COLUMBIA
MISSOURIAN, Aug. 15, 2010, available at http://www.columbiamissourian.com/
stories/2010/08/15/missouri-public-defender-offices-face-caseload-crunch/; Kathryn Wall,
Christian County Judge: Public Defender's Office Must Represent Client, SPRINGFIELD
NEWS LEADER, Aug. 11, 2010, available at http://www.news-leader.com/article/20100811/
NEWS01/8110432/Christian-County-judge-Public-defender-s-office-must-represent-client.
104. Heather Ratcliffe, Public Defenders Say Criticism Based on Bad Information, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 19, 2010, available at http://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/crime-and-courts/article_0le30ffd-ae92-504a-b9la-bc89a35e7e07.html.
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What should be the role of prosecutors when defense lawyers or
public defense programs challenge their caseloads? When it is clear
that defense lawyers are overwhelmed with cases and indigent
defense reform would enhance the administration of justice, is it
appropriate for prosecutors to oppose defense concerns about their
caseloads? Long ago the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that
prosecutors have broader responsibilities than simply to obtain
convictions,"o5 whereas the frequent response of prosecutors when
defense programs have challenged their caseloads suggests that this
broader duty is often ignored.
Under the ABA Model Rules and those of most jurisdictions, the
prosecutor is properly regarded as a "minister of justice,"" whose
responsibility is more than that of an advocate. The prosecutor has a
duty "to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice."'W For
prosecutors to oppose defense efforts in court to deal with excessive
caseloads, or to speak out publicly against such efforts, is inconsistent
with the duty of prosecutors to ensure that the justice system treats all
accused persons fairly and in accord with due process.
It is widely accepted under American law that indigent persons
charged with a crime or a juvenile offense have no choice about their
defense lawyer," and this rule applies even when the lawyer
requested by the accused is qualified and willing to provide
representation." Consistent with this approach, defendants cannot
105. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.").
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8, cmt. 1 (2007).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) ("[Tjhe essential aim of
the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant
rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom
the he prefers."); Hickey v. State, 576 S.E.2d 628, 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) ("An indigent
defendant is entitled to reasonably effective assistance of counsel, not counsel of his own
choice."); State v. Jimenez, 815 A.2d 976., 980 (N.J. 2003) ("[A]ccused is guaranteed the
right to the assistance of counsel, but not the constitutional right to counsel of his
choice.").
109. See, e.g., Drumgo v. Superior Court, 506 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Cal. 1973) (indigent
defendant's constitutional and statutory guarantees not violated by appointment of
attorney other than one requested even though requested counsel had indicated his
willingness and availability to act); Brewer v. State, 470 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1970) (finding no error in trial judge's refusal to appoint lawyer whom defendant
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insist that their lawyers be replaced due to their excessive workloads.
But when prosecutors are permitted to argue that the workloads of
counsel are reasonable and hence no relief should be granted to the
defense, the state of the law is truly quite remarkable-even though
the accused has no right to be heard about the selection of his or her
lawyer, the prosecutor does! In addition, regardless of motive, in
opposing defense efforts to reign in their caseloads, prosecutors are
seeking to weaken the capability of their adversary to mount a
defense on behalf of the accused. While this is not an express conflict
of interest under rules of professional responsibility,"o arguably, a
court should treat prosecution opposition to reductions in defender
caseloads as tantamount to a conflict.
The black-letter of the ABA Standards Related to the
Prosecution Function provide that the "[t]he duty of the prosecutor is
to seek justice, not merely to convict.""' And that "[i]t is an
important function of the prosecutor to seek to reform and improve
the administration of criminal justice. When inadequacies or
injustices in the substantive or procedural law come to the
prosecutor's attention, he or she should stimulate efforts for remedial
action."" 2  The commentary to the foregoing standards stress that
"the prosecutor's obligation is to protect the innocent as well as to
convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the accused, as well as to
enforce the rights of the public."" 3
Prosecution opposition to defense efforts to reduce their
caseloads, especially when the evidence of excessive caseloads is
compelling, violates the spirit of the foregoing provisions. However,
it is clear that the language quoted above has not restrained the
conduct of prosecutors. Accordingly, I would propose that an
additional black-letter provision be added to the Prosecution
requested, even though requested lawyer expressed willingness to serve as appointed co-
counsel).
110. The RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 through 1.11 are concerned with
conflicts of interest, but none of these provisions pertain to the kind of situation under
discussion here. The provisions of Rule 3.8 pertain to Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor, but none of these directly apply either. However, one of the provisions of
Rule 3.8 is concerned with making certain that the accused is notified about the right to
counsel and afforded an opportunity to obtain legal representation. See infra note 118 and
accompanying text.
111. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
STANDARDS, Std. 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA PROSECUTION FUNCTION
STANDARDS].
112. Id. at 3-1.2(d).
113. Id. at 5.
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Function Standards: "Prosecutors should not seek to exploit
weaknesses in the delivery of indigent defense services."H4  This
language complements current language in the ABA's Model Rules,
which includes several provisions aimed at securing procedural justice
for the accused."' Thus, the ABA Model Rules prohibit prosecutors
from proceeding with cases that are not supported by probable
cause116 and admonish prosecutors to "not seek to obtain from an
unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights."" 7
Prosecutors also are required to "make reasonable efforts to assure
that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure
for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to
obtain counsel."" 8
But quite aside from rules of professional conduct, ABA
Criminal Justice Standards, and conflict of interest considerations, in
114. The proposed standard finds support in the material quoted in this note (and
from additional material quoted at infra note 115), which is from an article dealing with
systemic neglect in indigent defense: "It is wrong for prosecutors to exploit systemic
neglect by pressuring defendants to plead guilty quickly. Rather, prosecutors should seek
ways to call attention to the problem and ameliorate it. A prosecutor is said to be 'a
minister of justice and not simply . . . an advocate.' Prosecutors must 'seek justice,' which
includes an obligation 'to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice.' Given
prosecutors' role, it has been recognized that they are obligated to call the courts'
attention to defense lawyers' professional lapses, such as impermissible conflicts of interest
that undermine the fairness of criminal proceedings. Similarly, if there is a systemic failure
of defense lawyers in the jurisdiction to represent their clients as diligently as ethics rules
demand, prosecutors should call public attention to the problem and encourage the
legislature to take steps, including appropriating sufficient funds, to address it." Bruce A.
Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.
J. 1169, 1192-93 (2003). In fairness, Professor Green's article is not primarily about
excessive caseloads in public defense; nor does his article propose a new ABA Prosecution
Function Standard.
115. The proposed language is also broad enough to cover various kinds of
prosecutorial practices, which are described in Professor Green's article: "Far from
compensating for defense lawyers' inadequacies, prosecutors seek in various ways to
exploit them. Prosecutors often pressure defendants to plead guilty soon after they are
arrested, before their attorneys have had an opportunity to conduct an investigation, by
making offers of leniency that will be taken off the table if not quickly accepted. Some
prosecutors couple the short deadline with a requirement that the defendant relinquish the
constitutional right to receive disclosures from the prosecution, a practice that the
Supreme Court recently upheld. These so-called 'fast-track' policies take advantage of
defendants whose appointed defense lawyers do not investigate as soon as a case is
assigned and who are reluctant to try cases. Prosecutors thereby preserve time and
resources while denying indigent defendants an opportunity to learn of possible
weaknesses in the prosecution's case." Id. at 1191-92.
116. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 3.8(a) (2007).
117. Id. at 3.8(c).
118. Id. at 3.8(b).
Summer 2011]1 979
most jurisdictions there is likely a serious question about whether a
prosecutor has standing to oppose defense motions respecting their
caseloads. The concept of "standing consists of an entity's sufficient
interest in the outcome of the litigation to warrant consideration of its
position by a court."". Merely because the prosecutor represents the
state in a criminal or juvenile proceeding does not in itself confer
standing on the prosecutor to object to all motions of the defense.
For example, a prosecutor's claim of standing was rejected in a case in
which an apartment's renter did not oppose a defendant's motion to
inspect and photograph the apartment that was the site of a crime
scene.120  The court noted that the prosecutor was "apparently
laboring under the unfounded misapprehension that by virtue of a
district attorney's mandate and authority to prosecute those charged
with crimes"l21 it had the right to be heard on the defense motion.
In two of the cases in which hearings were held concerning
defense challenges about caseloads, trial court judges concluded that
the prosecutors lacked standing to participate in the proceedings. In
a case in Kingman, Arizona, in which the public defender sought to
withdraw from certain cases to which it had been appointed, the
prosecutor appreciated that it would be awkward for him to take a
position on the ultimate issue before the court, but still the prosecutor
claimed a right to participate fully in the proceedings. The court
disagreed, as revealed in the following colloquy:
The Court: [Addressing the prosecutor, Mr. Zack]. Are you
here as an observer or are you taking the position that you have
the right to a more active involvement in this hearing.
Mr. Zack: Your Honor, I view the State's role in this hearing as
assisting the Court in whatever fact-finding determinations it
believes it has to make to make a ruling in this case. I'm not
here to dictate who represents each defendant. I recognize that
is an issue we're not involved in .... I do think that we do have
some role to play in this case, in this situation to make sure that
119. 1A C.J.S. Actions § 101 (2005).
120. People v. Davis, 647 N.Y.S.2d 392, 396 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1996) ("In sum, neither the
permission, acquiescence or cooperation of the District Attorney is required because the
District Attorney does not have possession, control nor any property interest in the
apartment and, to date, has not made any factual allegations based upon which the People
would even have standing to oppose, or to be heard in opposition to, defense counsel's
inspection thereof. Consequently, the District Attorney lacks standing to be heard in
opposition to this branch of defendant's application ..
121. Id. at 396.
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the Court gets the facts it needs to make the ruling it needs to
make ....
The Court: ... Are you ... reserving the right to cross-examine
witnesses that are present?
Mr. Zack: Yes.
The Court: Are you reserving the right to call witnesses and
have the evidence presented yourself?
Mr. Zack: I reserve the right....
The Court: Alright. Are you reserving the right to present
argument to me as to whether I should grant the Public
Defender's Office ... motions to withdraw?
Mr. Zack: I'm not going to take a position on those. Again, I'm
just here to assist in whatever fact finding the Court wants to
make.
The Court: ... Alright. Well, I think we need to clarify this
ahead of time.... I believe the authority that I'm familiar with
would suggest to me that this is not an issue that the County
Attorney's Office has standing to involve itself in....
The judge then explained that he understood that the prosecutor had
''an interest in decisions that could affect funding for the County,"
as well the timely prosecution of cases, and making certain that
persons did not languish in jail. But he still was "not going to allow
the County Attorney's Office to participate... other than simply
being present."124
Similarly, in litigation in Miami where the public defender's
office sought an order seeking to halt appointments in felony cases,
the trial court judge ruled: "the State Attorney does not have
standing as a matter of right."'" The court based its decision in part
122. Transcript of Record, Arizona v. Wayne 0. Hall et al., County of Mohave, Cause
No. CR-2007-1492, Dec. 13, 2007.
123. Id. at 11.
124. Id.
125. In re Reassignment and Consolidation of Public Defender's Motion to Appoint
Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases, Section CF 61, Administrative
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on prior Florida Supreme Court decisions that also involved motions
of public defenders seeking relief from excessive caseloads. On two
prior occasions, the court had ruled that in deciding such cases trial
court judges were not required to permit "the county an opportunity
to be heard before the appointment of [private] counsel, even though
it will be the responsibility of the county to compensate private
counsel."" 6
Conclusion
As the U.S. economy continues to struggle, the financial
problems of state and local governments have become increasingly
difficult. It is not surprising, therefore, that jurisdictions struggle to
allocate adequate funds for indigent defense services and that lawyers
and defense programs are often faced with inordinately high
workloads. Although the ABA has developed policies related to
defense workloads, there are still challenging issues that remain
unaddressed, as suggested in this paper. In a larger sense, the
foregoing discussion addresses how governments and courts deal with
constitutional rights and duties of professionals when adequate funds
are unavailable. Based upon my personal experience with the
excessive workload issue, I have become convinced that the lawyers
and programs that furnish defense services need to be vigorous in
standing up for their clients' right to counsel and in fulfilling their
duties under rules of professional conduct.
Order 08-14, In the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Miami-Dade
County, Florida, at 3 (Blake, J., Sept. 3, 2008). Judge Blake's decision in this case, both on
the issue of standing and on the merits, was reversed by an intermediate Florida appellate
court. Reversal on the issue of standing was based upon an interpretation of a state
statute and a change in Florida law related to the financing of indigent defense in Florida,
from county to state funding. See State v. Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 12
So.3d 798, 801 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009). The Public Defender appealed the Third District
Court of Appeals decision, and on May 19, 2010, the Florida Supreme Court accepted
jurisdiction of the case. See Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, No. SC09-
1181, 2010 WL 2025545 (Fla. May 19, 2010).
126. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit
Pub. Defender, 561 So.2d 1130, 1138 (Fla. 1990). See also Escambia County v. Behr, 384
So.2d 147, 150 (Fla. 1980).
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